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Abstract
A type of argument occasionally made in metaethics, epistemology and
philosophy of science notes that most ordinary uses of some expression fail
to satisfy the strictest interpretation of the expression, and concludes that
the ordinary assertions are false. This requires there to be a presumption
in favour of a strict interpretation of expressions that admit of interpre-
tations at different levels of strictness. We argue that this presumption is
unmotivated, and thus the arguments fail.
1 Loose talk
A wide range of expressions can be given more or less strict interpretations, for
example, ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. Sometimes we use them in loose ways: when we
say the fridge is empty, we don’t mean it is an absolute vacuum. Sometimes we
use these expressions intending to defer to the strict usage of relevant experts:
when we say that an event is probable, we aim to invoke the concept as defined
by experts on probability theory, even if we ourselves don’t know exactly what
that is.1
When we borrow an expression from a strict science, we may employ
harmless-for-our-purposes simplifications that make our utterances, strictly
speaking, false. We often use language this way: when describing my rheuma-
toid pain I may say that I have ‘arthritis in my thigh’, and it will be clear enough
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what I mean. But I aim to mean by ‘arthritis’ what my doctor means, so if she
informs me that it refers only to aﬄictions of the joints, I will adjust my usage.
When we aim to use an expression as the experts do, but our everyday purposes
aren’t demanding, we often get by with uses that don’t quite meet the strict
standards. Call these cases of speaking strictly-enough.
In other cases, our everyday purposes require not using the strict sense.
Suppose on a hiking trip I advise against drinking water from a stagnant pool,
and someone (call them Peter), replies ‘well actually, the wind is causing slight
disturbances and currents in the water; it isn’t quite stagnant.’ I can simply
dismiss Peter’s comment; plausibly my utterance invoked a looser standard.
Or suppose I mention that two friends arrived at my party at the same time
and Peter interjects that according to physics no two events are ever truly
simultaneous, so strictly speaking, they did not arrive at the same time (Lewis,
1989, 136). Again, I can acknowledge that Peter isn’t wrong without having
to concede that what I said was false. I invoked a looser interpretation of the
expression, and can stand by what I actually said. Call this a case of speaking
loosely.
You get the flavor: we’ll be using ‘strict’ to invoke the standards used
by the relevant naturalistically respectable science, while ‘loose’ invokes our
(usually less demanding) everyday standards. Differences of strictness are
unlike polysemy; even once we fix on a sense of ‘organic’, for example, there is
a further question about how demanding our standards are.
There’s an apparent contrast between speaking strictly-enough and speaking
loosely. When we’re speaking strictly-enough, the correct interpretation of the
utterance — the interpretation which specifies the semantic value of the ex-
pression — is the strict one, so what we’ve said is literally false. But when
we’re speaking loosely, the fact that what we’ve said would be literally false
if interpreted in the strict sense doesn’t seem to threaten the truth of what we’ve
actually said; we weren’t speaking strictly.
There are three salient explanations of this apparent contrast for a target
expression e:
• always strict – The strictest interpretation of e is always the correct one.
When speaking loosely, we are just unaware (or ignoring the fact) that
what we’re saying is false.
• presumptively strict – The strictest interpretation of e has defeasible
priority over looser interpretations.
• not special – When the strictest interpretation of e is correct, it is because
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strictness serves our communicative purposes; the strictness itself does
not, even defeasibly, give us reason to think it is the correct interpretation.
always strict takes the strictness of an interpretation as a decisive reason in
favour of a strict interpretation; presumptively strict allows that this pressure
can sometimes be overridden in favour of a looser interpretation.2 We argue that
one should resist imposing an overarching interpretive principle that favours
the strict reading either decisively or just strongly, and instead embrace not
special. The strictest standard is correct only when we are deferring to it or our
purposes demand it, and our communicative purposes do not always require
deference.
Incidentally, the strictest interpretation isn’t always the correct one even
in clear-cut cases of deference; we can defer to looser interpretations. When
Gus, a botanist, tells his neighbours that the brownies he’s brought to their
picnic contain nuts, he intends to defer to the common interpretation of ‘nut’,
which includes peanuts.3 Gus (being an expert) knows that the strictest sense
of ‘nut’ excludes peanuts, but intentionally defers to a looser interpretation in
this context. Deference doesn’t always imply strictness.
So, we have two kinds of cases and three candidate explanations. We say
one should prefer not special. We will argue for this in §2 and point out why
it matters in §3.
2 What we mean
There aren’t language-independent facts about what the expressions of a lan-
guage must mean. Linguistic expressions are communicative tools, and their
meaning is tied to how we use them: what we generally use them to mean, and
what we generally interpret them as meaning. In short,
use-guides-meaning: the meaning of a term is, usually, just what
it would have to be for the linguistic practices (communication,
coordination, testimony) to succeed as they do in the community.
This is one of the metasemantic principles invoked when theorists say stronger
things, like that the meaning of an expression in a language is just what it
2Note that the strictness of an interpretation need not correspond to its determinacy. A loose
interpretation might be fully determinate, e.g. when one stipulates that two events are simultaneous
if they’re separated by an interval of at most 5 seconds. It is similarly possible for a strict standard
to be indeterminate.
3Botanically, peanuts are legumes. This example is borrowed from Begby (2014, 11).
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must be for the sentences in which it used by competent speakers of a lan-
guage to mostly come out true. use-guides-meaning is a principle about the
semantic meaning of expressions, not merely about what utterances involving
that expression pragmatically convey. It’s a very attractive principle, and also
a relatively weak one.
Importantly, use-guides-meaning doesn’t imply that the expressions mean
whatever would make most of our utterances true. When we borrow expres-
sions from a strict science, much of what we say in everyday contexts is false,
because we aim to mean the same thing as the experts, despite having only
a hazy grasp of what that is. Our hazy grasp might be wildly inaccurate or
inconsistent, leading us to make utterances that are mostly false, because we’re
mistaken about what we mean by the expression. Not knowing what we’re talk-
ing about doesn’t preclude our talking about it (Putnam, 1972; Burge, 1979).
The key to this — what makes us mistaken about what we mean, rather than
meaning something other than what the experts mean — is semantic deference
(Armstrong, 2016; Lassiter, 2008). We intend to use the expression as they use it,
and this intention bears a couple of hallmarks. First, while our communicative
purposes might not require that we speak strictly, they aren’t in tension with
doing so. While we have reason to coordinate our uses with that of the experts,
our immediate aims don’t require precision, so getting the details right is just
not worth the hassle. But our aims wouldn’t be undermined by speaking
strictly.
Second, we’re disposed (when corrected) to bring our use into line. This
has both a backward-looking aspect — retracting previous uses that we now
recognise are false— and a forward-looking aspect — updating our future uses
to better match the strict interpretation. These hallmarks are features of our
usage that make the expression inherit the strict interpretation, and they’re
prominent in cases when we’re speaking strictly-enough.
But not all cases where the folk’s use diverges from those of experts are
cases of deference. Sometimes our communicative purposes are best served by
not using the strict senses used by experts. I can acknowledge that Peter is right
that in the strictest sense of ‘stagnant’, the pond isn’t stagnant, without coming
under rational pressure to retract my assertion that ‘we shouldn’t drink this
water because it’s stagnant.’ Nor am I under any pressure to apply ‘stagnant’
only to absolutely motionless bodies of water in the future. Our communicative
purposes, and the warnings against drinking from stagnant pools, require
not invoking the strict sense. More generally, cases of speaking loosely yield
different disagreement and retraction patterns than cases of speaking strictly-
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enough: the former don’t bear the hallmarks of deference.
Taken together, these features of the cases and the use-guides-meaning prin-
ciple make always strict unattractive. How does presumptively strict fare?
Recall that it ascribes presumptive priority to the strictest reading because it’s
strict. But this gets the order of explanation backwards: in the cases just dis-
cussed, when the strict interpretation is correct it is so not because it is strict,
but because strictness accords with our communicative purposes.
3 Strictly-speaking false
You may consider it no great loss to sacrifice always strict; it wasn’t very
attractive anyway. Quite so. But rejecting it deals a significant blow to what
we’ll call strictly-speaking arguments, that is, arguments that fit the following
schema:
strictly-speaking argument schema
(1) On the strictest interpretation, the expression e means ‘. . .’
(2) Most (all) of our ordinary assertions using e are false under the strictest
interpretation.
(3) So most (all) of our ordinary assertions using e are false.
(4) Loose uses of e suit our communicative purposes better than the uses
consistent with the strictest interpretation.
(5) So, despite (3), we should go on using e loosely.
This is obviously enthymematic; (3) only follows from (1) and (2) insofar as the
strict interpretation of e is correct, even in our ordinary, loose conversations. It
would follow from always strict, but given (4), accepting this as the suppressed
premise is inconsistent with use-guides-meaning. So, given the plausibility
of the principle, we might prefer invoking presumptively strict. But here
advocates of strictly-speaking arguments incur an explanatory burden: why
doesn’t (4) defeat the presumption in favour of the strict reading of e? When
the folk take themselves to mean, and interpret others as meaning, something
looser, and successfully coordinate on the basis of those assumptions, our use-
guides-meaning principle suggests the term just does mean that looser thing. What
is more, these cases don’t have the hallmarks of deference.
Plausibly, the considerations one must raise to discharge this explanatory
burden will need to be specific to the expression at issue. Strictly-speaking
5
arguments arise in a variety of semantic disputes, including moral error theory,
counterfactual scepticism, and global epistemic scepticism.4 The specific justifi-
cations available might be different in the various cases, and though we suspect
the same explanatory idleness will appear in each context, for the sake of a con-
crete discussion we’ll use Ha´jek (ms)’s argument that most counterfactuals are
false as a representative example of a strictly speaking argument.
Briefly, Ha´jek argues that, strictly speaking, counterfactual constructions of
the form ‘A would C’ are true only if the probability of (A& ∼ C) is 0. But for
just about any counterfactual claim, there is a non-zero probability, however
strange or unlikely, of (A& ∼ C). This is because (science tells us) the world
is genuinely chancy at the most fundamental level. So when I tell my toddler
‘were you to drop that glass, it would shatter’, I speak falsely. But, he says,
I shouldn’t worry about that; truth is overblown, and we have more weighty
conversational purposes which would be undermined by eschewing loose talk
to bring our usage in line with the strictest standard. Doing so would convey –
would be interpreted as saying – that the law-like regularities usually expressed
by counterfactual claims don’thold for the object in question. If I told my toddler
merely that ‘the glass would very likely shatter’, he could justifiably conclude
that the glass is unusually shatter-resistant (Ha´jek, ms, 56).
What Ha´jek needs in order to discharge the explanatory burden for his
strictly-speaking argument is to defend the claim that there is a presumption in
favor of strictness that isn’t defeated by these practical conversational purposes.
This must involve demonstrating that the presumption does explanatory work
over and above that done by the sorts of deference facts appealed to in not
special.
The main reason he offers to embrace such a presumption is that it anchors
the meanings of e: it gives uses stable interpretations, and validates important
inference patterns. Allowing the strictness of the interpretation of ‘A would
C’ to shift across contexts risks invalidating important dualities (e.g. [A
C]↔∼ [A∼ C]), or rendering the meaning of counterfactuals insufficiently
stable to facilitate communication, disagreement, etc. The meaning needs to be
anchored down somehow, and the strictest standard seems to be a reasonably
well-motivated, non-arbitrary candidate.
We agree that the meaning needs to be somewhat anchored, but we needn’t
4For instances of strictly-speaking arguments in moral error theory, see for example Mackie
(1977, ch.1); in counterfactual scepticism, see Ha´jek (ms, § 2 and 4); in global scepticism about
knowledge, see Davis (2010), and DeRose (2012) for a rejoinder. Also see Kennedy (2007), Klecha
(2018), Lasersohn (1999), and Unger (1971) for more general arguments for strict standards for all
‘absolute’ terms.
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embrace anything stronger than not special to accomplish this. Deference
allows us to anchor the meaning of e to a relatively public interpretation —
which may or may not be the strictest one. This is how there is a stable in-
terpretation of ‘nut’, even though it isn’t the botanically strict one. Sandgren
and Steele (ms) illustrate one way to accomplish this for counterfactuals. They
suggest that the usual purpose of counterfactual claims is to indicate objective
regularities in the world. We reject counterfactual assertions that fail this test,
successfully coordinate with those that pass it, and interpret them as assert-
ing something like a robust connection (quite like a ceteris paribus law in the
special sciences) holding between the explicit antecedent and consequent in
the domain of inquiry invoked. Crucially, the domain invoked need not be
fundamental physics: when making claims about geological patterns, say, we
aren’t concerned with quantum tunnelling effects, since these effects tend to
confound the geological regularities. The standards of fundamental physics
are in a sense more strict, but they’re in an important way inappropriate when
we’re talking about whether a shield volcano would erupt explosively.
As this illustrates, it is possible to identify adequately stable standards
without invoking maximal strictness. Speakers can coordinate on these by
deferring to the science. And even if we aren’t usually speaking strictly, we can
when our purposes require it. So we can preserve the features of counterfactuals
that concern Ha´jek when we’re making claims about fundamental physics; they
do really hold in that domain. But they don’t rise up to coerce counterfactuals
about other domains. Peter is right that from the perspective of fundamental
physics, no spatially separated events happen simultaneously; but that doesn’t
mean that we can’t arrive at a party at the same time.
Our interests in fundamental physics don’t supersede our interests in using
our language to coordinate, facilitate testimony, and communicate, and these
latter interests exert more immediate pressure on interpreting our expressions.
Crucially, denying presumptively strict doesn’t mean that anything goes, nor
that what emeans is completely up to the speaker. There are still constraints; the
language pushes back. It’s just that the norms of inquiry that are appropriate to
one domain (including standards of precision demanded) aren’t automatically
appropriate to other domains.
One might still think that strict standards enjoy at least some kind of pre-
sumptive priority, evidenced by the fact that strict standards are ’sticky’: harder
to shift away from, in some sense. If strict standards were difficult to shake in
this way, and the difficulty cannot be explained by the usefulness of being strict, that
would be some evidence for presumptively strict. But we contend that when
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standards resist loosening it is because the stricter standard is useful. Useful-
ness for our conversational purposes is the engine of interpretation in these
cases, not the strictness per se. As evidence, recall that I can acknowledge that
Peter speaks truly when he says that ‘strictly speaking, water is only stagnant
if it has no current at all’, while felicitously resisting the strict standard. Given
that our interest in whether the water is stagnant is driven by whether it is safe
to drink, and water is unsafe well before it is completely devoid of current, I
can cheerfully reply that ‘strictly speaking, you’re right, but that doesn’t mat-
ter. This water is stagnant so we shouldn’t drink it.’ The felicity of this reply
suggests that the usefulness of a standard, rather than its strictness, is doing
the metasemantic work.5 The facts about usefulness can fully account for the
stickiness of stricter standards, without invoking presumptively strict.
Could the felicity of speaking loosely be explained with pragmatics? As-
suredly. But why should it need to be? All parties to this debate accept that
conversational purposes have a role in determining meaning. The onus is on
the advocates of presumptively strict to explain why such a presumption is
necessary; why appealing to conversational purposes isn’t sufficient to explain
the semantic value of loose uses. And if we’re right that usefulness is what
explains the relevance of the strict standard when we’re speaking strictly, then
why wouldn’t the usefulness of loose standards render the loose standards rel-
evant when we’re speaking loosely? Symmetry suggests that what we literally
say, when speaking loosely, is true.6
4 A parting challenge
Strictly-speaking arguments only run when the strictest interpretation is the
correct one; these arguments depend on always strict or at least presumptively
strict. But this presumption in favour of strict interpretations is unmotivated.
The cases that support taking the strict interpretation to be correct (speaking
5Lewis (1979, 353) makes a similar point, writing that ‘[Unger] can indeed create an unusual
context in which hardly anything can acceptably be called ‘flat’, but he hasn’t thereby cast any
discredit on the more usual contexts in which lower standards of precision are in force.’ For those
keeping score at home, what we’re advocating here differs from Lewis at two key points: (i) we
distinguish strictness from precision (the latter being a matter of the determinacy of a standard, see
fn 2), and (ii) we hold that loose talk can be simply true, not merely ‘true enough’.
6For those tempted by the pragmatic treatment of these cases (a` la Lasersohn, 1999, 526-27), why
shouldn’t we say that when speaking loosely, what we literally say is true — the semantic value of
the expression is tied to the loose standard — but we might pragmatically convey something false,
because hearers might mistakenly invoke the strict standards?
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strictly-enough) tend to bear the hallmarks of deference, but many of the cases
to which the strictly-speaking arguments are applied (speaking loosely) don’t.
The main considerations in favour of taking strict interpretations to be correct
can be wholly accommodated by the much weaker not special, which has
the additional virtue of being easily compatible with the attractive use-guides-
meaning metasemantic principle. Our communicative purposes don’t always
require deference, and even when they do, they don’t always invoke the strictest
standard. We contend that the strictest standard is correct only when we’re
deferring to it or our purposes demand it.
If all this is right, then in ordinary cases where our purposes don’t require the
strictest interpretation, there is no compelling reason to think that the strictest
interpretation is correct, and so no reason to think we’re speaking falsely. So
those who want to wield a strictly-speaking argument must first address three
pressing questions:
(i) Why must we take the strict standard to be correct in cases of speak-
ing loosely, despite the striking differences between them and cases of
speaking strictly-enough?
(ii) What explains the implied failure of the use-guides-meaning principle in
these cases?
(iii) What do we gain by incurring these costs: why isn’t the ability to some-
times speak strictly sufficient?
If cases of speaking loosely don’t involve deference to the strictest standard,
and do come under the purview of the use-guides-meaning principle, then the
strictest interpretation of e isn’t the appropriate one for our everyday uses.
We’re speaking truly, precisely because what we assert isn’t what we would
have asserted if we were speaking strictly. All of this is compatible with 1, 2,
and 4 of the strictly-speaking argument: all it denies is 3.
So we’re throwing down the gauntlet to the defenders of strictly-speaking
arguments: why should we think that the folk are, despite their intentions,
non-deferential attitudes, ability to co-ordinate meanings, and communicative
successes, in fact speaking strictly, and, strictly speaking, speaking falsely?7
7Our thanks to Justin D’Ambrosio, Kyle Dickey, Alan Ha`jek, and Daniel Nolan, as well as to
two anonymous referees at this journal, for comments which helped improve this paper.
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